Scientists' coping strategies in an evolving research system: the case of life scientists in the UK by Morris, Norma & Rip, Arie
Science and Public Policy May 2006 0302-3427/06/040253-11 US$08.00  Beech Tree Publishing 2006  253
Science and Public Policy, volume 33, number 4, May 2006, pages 253–263, Beech Tree Publishing, 10 Watford Close, Guildford, Surrey GU1 2EP, England 
Proactive adaptation 
Scientists’ coping strategies in an evolving  
research system: the case of life scientists in  
the UK 
Norma Morris and Arie Rip
Scientists in academia have struggled to adjust to 
a policy climate of uncertain funding and loss of 
freedom from direction and control. How UK life 
scientists have negotiated this challenge, and 
with what consequences for their research and 
the research system, is the empirical entrance 
point of this paper. We find that policy impacts 
can be modulated and buffered by strategies and 
compromises devised and deployed at research 
performer level. This shifts conceptualisation 
from terms of responses to one of more or less 
proactive strategies of scientists and science or-
ganisations which add up, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, to shifts in the overall system. 
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CIENTISTS IN ACADEMIA — faced with 
governments’ requirement for relevance (Rip, 
1997), a new insistence on accountability and 
management (Braun and Merrien, 1999), and re-
trenchment in public funding — had to adjust to the 
loss of what many had come to regard as a right: the 
‘right’ to grant funding and the ‘right’ to be free of 
direction and control (Rip, 1994). How life scientists 
in the UK have negotiated and survived these chal-
lenges, and with what consequences for their re-
search and the research system, is the empirical 
entrance point of this paper. We find that policy im-
pacts can be modulated and buffered in a variety of 
ways, not least by strategies, both collective and in-
dividual, and strategic compromises devised and 
deployed at the research performer level. This might 
lead to the cynical conclusion that the most striking 
effect of policies on research is the development of a 
series of elaborate countermeasures. But these meas-
ures are not merely neutralising. They are rather the 
scaffolding supporting researchers’ adaptation to 
new circumstances, providing a platform for ‘give 
and take’ behind which the system and its 
institutions continue to evolve. 
This is the topic we address in this paper. It can be 
marked as a shift from a conceptualisation in terms 
of responses, to one of more or less proactive strate-
gies of scientists and science organisations which 
add up, intentionally or unintentionally, to shifts in 
the overall system. 
The empirical work on which this study is based 
took place primarily in the biological sciences de-
partments of four English universities in the years 
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umbrella organisation Biosciences Federation only 
in December 2002). This may underlie the bias we 
have observed among life scientists towards strate-
gies that operate either over science as a whole or at 
the individual or group level, with rather slower de-
velopment of proactive responses at the intermediate 
level of department, school or centre. Overall, it 
seems likely that the marked growth and rapid de-
velopment of biosciences will encourage organisa-
tional flexibility and transdisciplinarity (viz. the Norma Morris has been a research fellow at University Col-
lege London since 1996, having previously spent some
years as a senior manager and policy-maker at the UK
Medical Research Council. Her research interests are in
science policy and research governance, impacts of new
technology on regulatory research, and the role of volunteer
research subjects in biomedical research. 
Arie Rip is professor in Philosophy of Science and Technol-
ogy at the University of Twente, the Netherlands. His re-
search interests are science dynamics, sociology of
technology and (constructive) technology assessments. 54 Science and Public Policy May 2006 
997 to 1999. The methodology has already been 
escribed in previously published articles (e.g. Mor-
is, 2002a). In brief, departments were selected on 
riteria including research commitment, postgradu-
te training programme and representation of the 
ain types of UK university. In each department, a 
ross-section of members was interviewed; inter-
iews were also held with administrators and man-
gers at departmental and university levels. Their 
esponses were compared with what funding bodies 
aid about their policies in corporate plans, strategy 
ocuments and official notices. These data were 
upplemented by interviews with representatives of 
ajor stakeholders and by studies of grant condi-
ions. Documentary sources included both published 
nd confidential papers and reports. In total, 56 in-
erviews were conducted, involving 74 people. 
Although there have been modifications to policy 
ince the main fieldwork was done, the data remain 
alid for our analysis of strategic repertoires and 
ulti-level interactions which operate over extended 
ime-scales. The most significant change in the last 
ive years has been the rise of some £1.5bn in gov-
rnment investment in science. But the funding is 
redicated on a sustained belief in the key role of sci-
nce for the UK’s future prosperity and is coupled 
ith policies designed to steer science to faster 
chievement of those economic goals (see for exam-
le DTI 2005). While the basis of government fund-
ng for science remains wealth creation and proactive 
olicies to this end, requirements for accountability 
nd working with users (especially industry), and 
echanisms to steer research agendas will remain 
irmly in place. Despite the overall increase in fund-
ng, competition for grants remains stiff, and the main 
lanks of government science policy differ little from 
hose of the early 1990s (OST, 1993) in terms of the 
otential threat to scientists’ independence and liveli-
ood and the strategies they evoke. 
We have chosen the biosciences as the site of in-
estigation since their comparatively recent rise to 
ational importance, continuing economic potential 
nd still evolving organisational structure both give 
hem topical interest and make them a good site for 
tudying change and adaptation. Perhaps as a result 
f their rapid development, life sciences have lagged 
ehind physics, chemistry and engineering in devel-
ping a formalised collective identity (forming the 
emergence of biophysics; Chadarevian, 2002) while 
their tradition of engaging with medical and envi-
ronmental users may make for open-mindedness 
towards some of government’s policy goals. Thus 
biosciences may be expected to be a fertile ground 
for the development of constructive strategies for 
‘answering back’ to top-down policies. 
General perspective 
In what sense might scientists’ strategic responses to 
policy be said to contribute to a scaffolding for adap-
tation? We have to locate such responses in an 
evolving multi-level system. The building blocks for 
such a perspective are available. In this section  
we sketch the overall picture. In the next section, we 
focus on the clusters of interacting strategies that  
we encountered in our empirical study. 
Multi-level systems analysis 
Scientists’ responses have to be viewed in the con-
text of the wider research system in which they op-
erate. We conceptualise a research system as a 
multi-level social system held together by mutual 
interdependencies (Rip and Van der Meulen, 1996). 
The system comprises a macro level of government, 
a meso level of institutions (such as research coun-
cils, funding councils and coordinating bodies) hav-
ing the task of refining policies and designing and 
resourcing programmes for implementation, and the 
micro level where programmes and policies translate 
into action by research performers (Braun, 1993; 
Van der Meulen and Rip, 1998). Each level has its 
own attributes and to a large extent its own dynamic, 
but its development is influenced by and influences 
the development of the others. 
In times of change boundaries change, 
roles evolve, new institutions may be 
created and new actors may enter the 
field: so that the nature of the 
interdependencies changes 
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However, in times of change boundaries change, 
roles evolve, new institutions may be created and 
new actors may enter the field: so that the nature of 
the interdependencies changes (Rip and Van der 
Meulen, 1996). Positioning an analysis of the effects 
of science policy within this multi-level, multi-actor 
framework enables us to indicate how some of the 
strategies developed by research performers in the 
face of policy requirements may reshape or reinforce 
interdependencies across the levels of the system 
and thus contribute to its evolution. It also directs 
attention to structural features of the system, such as 
the significant presence in the UK of meso-level 
mediating institutions heavily populated by scientists 
and ex-scientists, which can be exploited by research 
performers to their own advantage. 
Principal-agent theory 
Within this multi-level framework, we use principal-
agent theory to help to understand how scientists’ 
strategies may nuance the working relationships 
across levels. Principal-agent theory originated in 
contract theory economics, as a means of under-
standing and managing the relationship between the 
principal and his contracting agent, and the costs that 
this entails. The theory has required much adaptation 
and development for use in wider contexts (Moe, 
1984; Coleman, 1990) and specifically for applica-
tion to research systems (for a succinct overview see 
Braun and Guston, 2003). But the central concept of 
the principal (who has the resources) needing to 
delegate to an agent (who has the skills) to achieve 
his or her goals, and the generic problems and 
strategies that managing this relationship entails, has 
proved useful in illuminating some aspects of pat-
terns and tensions occurring in research systems 
(Braun, 1993; Guston, 1996; Caswill, 1998; Van der 
Meulen, 1998). 
One added complexity in a layered research system 
is ambiguity over who is principal and who is agent. 
Government is the ultimate principal, but rarely dele-
gates directly to the research-performer (micro) level. 
Most research systems have an intermediary level of 
research council, to whom government delegates re-
sponsibility for deployment of research funds. Re-
search councils are thus agents of government but 
must then themselves delegate to the scientific com-
munity for performance of the actual research tasks. 
Scientists as agents thus usually relate to a research 
council (or other intermediary body) as their princi-
pal. The strategies we have observed scientists using 
therefore tend to be directed at relationships with their 
immediate principal – the intermediary bodies — 
rather than government itself. 
Micro-level dynamics 
Third, we consider researchers’ responses to policy 
from the point of view of how they contribute to  
or tend to modify the dynamics at the micro level, 
drawing on the ethnographic investigations of ‘the 
real-time processes’ of scientific knowledge produc-
tion undertaken from the late 1970s (see for example 
Knorr-Cetina, 1994). Dealing with the demands of 
science policy requires the enlargement of ‘political’ 
activity and processes of articulation (Fujimura, 
1987) that have to be conducted across levels of the 
system to accommodate the interests of policy mak-
ers, sponsors and users as well as of researchers’ own 
institutions and peer networks. This may lead to a de 
facto redefinition of what it means to do research. 
There are questions too about how researchers 
deal with the pressures to shift research direction 
generated by policies for steering the research 
agenda. The culture (and career structure) of scien-
tific research in universities requires each researcher 
to aspire to running his or her independent research 
programme. To this end young researchers need, as 
soon as local custom allows, to demonstrate their 
capacity for original and independent work that will 
buy reputation and recognition by peers. A policy 
that constrains choice of research topic is both a 
practical threat to this progression (by reducing el-
igibility for funding) and a challenge to the notion 
that ‘independence’ normally includes control of the 
scientific agenda (Morris, 2002b). Such a policy is 
equally a threat to more established scientists who 
risk loss of their cultural capital (built up over many 
iterations of the ‘credibility cycle’; Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979) if they change their research field 
(Ziman, 1987; see also Mulkay, 1972) under finan-
cial pressure. 
Following from this we conclude that the internal 
dynamics of the micro level as they relate specifi-
cally to policy requirements will drive researchers, 
encircled with a multiplicity of pressures in their 
daily lives, to be selective in their attention to poli-
cies, and to aim to manage them in the context of 
other competing demands. 
Managing complexity 
Figure 1 attempts to capture how, from the research 
performer’s viewpoint, external policies must com-
pete for attention with other equally pressing issues 
The kind of considerations researchers must deal 
with can be fleshed out from the empirical studies as 
follows: 
• Whether they are keeping up with the science, 
their competitors, the latest techniques, and the 
end of the era of the ‘man and dog’ team in bio-
logical sciences. 
• Legitimate ways of managing the increased press-
ures of global competition: should they share in-
formation less readily? Can they negotiate with 
competitors to divide up the patch, or defuse 
head-to-head competition by agreeing on simulta-
neous publication? 
• The stage of an individual’s career: does the re-
searcher need quick results to bolster his or her 
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next job application? Is he or she senior enough to 
get a five-year rather than a three-year grant? Will 
working on an industry-funded project adversely 
affect promotion prospects? 
• How vulnerable is the group’s funding — how 
might they hedge the risk? One way is to do work 
for industry or other users (e.g. government de-
partments) to gain access to new money or pro-
vide a small pot of funds from contract work 
useful for ‘tiding over’ or getting new work 
started. Another is to spread one’s favours (i.e. 
grant applications) to avoid being dependent on 
one particular sponsor. 
These researcher preoccupations are likely to affect 
the degree to which researchers will be aware of or 
take issue with external policy requirements or ini-
tiatives. Reactions to policy will be geared to how 
far they are judged likely to affect funding or career 
prospects, or the ability to complete work satisfac-
torily (e.g. the time-consuming aspects of increased 
accountability). Thus responses will range from 
overt stratagems to counter perceived disruptive ef-
fects through more covert reinterpretation and ap-
propriation of selected elements in the service of 
other aims, to indifference where non-compliance is 
seen as posing little risk (e.g. engaging with the pub-
lic; Morris, 2000). 
Coping and countervailing strategies 
Policies are designed and formulated primarily at the 
macro and meso levels for implementation by re-
search performers at the micro level. These policies 
may often have as their aim changing the existing 
practices and culture of the micro level. We interpret 
the countervailing strategies that scientists develop 
not as mere blocking tactics, but rather as an attempt 
to manage the pace of change, to re-assert or re-
present their own core values, and to improve the 
security of their funding. The strategies are a way of 
‘buying time’ for both themselves and the policy-
makers to evolve towards some more stable form of 
modus vivendi. The strategies can accommodate 
gradual shifts in scientists’ own positions as well as 
influencing policies and policy-makers. 
The two main destabilising features of govern-
ment policies of the 1980s and 1990s may be 
crudely summarised as the threat to scientific inde-
pendence and the threat to continuity of funding. 
The two are of course interrelated since getting 
funding may now often require some compromise on 
topic of research and acceptance of more stringent 
conditions of accountability. At the same time, the 
culture of individualism and scientific autonomy is 
still part of the self-image of university scientists, 
nearly half a century after the publication of The Re-
public of Science (Polanyi, 1962; Rip, 1994; Henkel, 
2000a). When stating their personal priorities and 
criteria for success — in what appears to be a defen-
sive stance — researchers put particular emphasis on 
freedom to follow their own ideas (Henkel, 2000a: 
200; Morris, 2002b). This reflects the residues of an 
idealised view of freedom of inquiry, the normal 
requirements of building a reputation, and a lifestyle 
choice in favour of the academic life, for all its in-
security and low pay, because “I want to do what 
interests me”. 
Published studies of scientists’ response to poli-
cies spanning the period from the 1980s onwards 
make reference to the strategies that scientists em-
ploy, but vary in their assessment of the importance 
and pervasiveness of these strategies. These varia-
tions may reflect differences in the time and place of 
the studies. Hackett (1987) for example finds US 
neuroscientists only just coming to terms with the 
absence of discretionary funding, tougher assess-
ment standards and closer accountability for grants. 
He finds some scientists engaging in strategic com-
promises, but notes other more negative reactions 
(such as opting for ‘safe’ projects and exploiting 
assistant staff) that could be damaging in the long 
Academic  
researcher 
New developments 
in science 
External policies 
Diversifying 
funding 
Career 
pressures 
Global 
competition 
Figure 1. Heterogeneous preoccupations of academic scientists 
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term. Ziman (1987) is basically sanguine about sci-
entists’ ability to adapt positively, and argues that 
the problem in the early 1980s in the UK was the 
“abrupt, involuntary changes” forced on them by 
science policy, with insufficent time to smooth and 
legitimise their transitions. 
Schimank and Stucke (1994), writing from a 
European perspective, sound a gloomy note in their 
title of Coping with Trouble, and provide a classifi-
cation of “coping” which includes a category of 
“suffering” and one of “defensive coping” (i.e. 
downsizing). Though all their categories can still be 
recognised today, in the UK at least the effects of 
early retirements, along with redeployment of staff 
into teaching or administration, has left a research 
population selected for “active coping”, and this af-
fects the balance of active and passive approaches. 
Both Henkel (2000b) and Trowler (1998) (the latter 
in the context of higher education reform) character-
ise UK academics as highly proactive in their re-
sponse to policies. As Henkel says, academics 
should not be understood as “passive recipients” of 
policy, but “as an active population … able to draw 
on well institutionalised, as well as individual, 
strategies to obtain the means to obtain their ends” 
(Henkel, 2000a). Our data on UK life scientists sup-
ports a similar view. 
Four clusters of interacting strategies 
Under the post-World War 2 formula of Science: 
The Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945) the goals of sci-
entific independence and of continuity of funding 
could be combined, but now trade-offs are neces-
sary, or “managing the pace of change”. This in-
cludes shifts of own goals (new practices) as well as 
attempts to shift others. We discuss below four clus-
ters of strategies through which scientists aim to 
control the impact and influence the direction of 
policies. 
Scientists’ strategic use of ‘science’ 
Scientists often refer to ‘science’ as the main influ-
ence and driver of their professional lives. By this 
they appear to mean the whole amalgam of past and 
new knowledge, new enabling technologies, meth-
odological discipline, intellectual fashion, and the 
successes of competitors. They tend to present it as a 
power separate from and independent of the institu-
tions of state, of policy-making and of research. It is 
offered as having its own dynamic and its own rules 
(witness comments such as “We must go where the 
science leads”; “That’s not how science works”). 
This use of science (which we emphasise hereaf-
ter by capitalising the term) effectively makes of 
Science an “abstract sponsor” of research (Rip, 
1997). As such, it is a useful construct for negotia-
tions between scientists and their actual sponsors. At 
the same time, it draws strength and plausibility 
from encapsulating the recognised internal dynamic 
of science as an institution, whereby the internally 
generated agenda that arises from scientific advances 
creates new scientific opportunities and needs. Sci-
entists may use it to support their claims or pro-
posals, or may find themselves stranded because 
Science has moved on. 
Research councils, as well as research performers, 
acknowledge its influence and use it in support of 
their strategic priorities under the rubric of “realising 
research opportunities” (RCUK, 2003). The Medical 
Research Council (MRC) has traditionally boasted of 
being “science-led”, or “mission-led”, not “finance-
led” (MRC, 1986: 1, 1995: 6, 11). More subtly, it of-
fers its own science-led definition of what constitutes 
‘value for money’ (and who shall be the judge of it) by 
reference to “scientific value for money” (MRC, 
2002; emphasis added). By invoking Science as its 
driving force and arbiter of its decisions, MRC rein-
forces the existence and power of this abstract spon-
sor and potential buffer against undue influence from 
MRC’s actual sponsor, government. 
In principal-agent terms, Science acts as one of the 
multiple principals that feature in many modern re-
search systems. It offers not financial but symbolic 
resources; scientists engage with its agenda in the ex-
pectation of mutual benefit — successful and ground-
breaking research that advances both science and their 
careers — and feel comfortable acting as the agent of 
Science. Following the dictates of Science, unlike 
following the dictates of government, is not perceived 
as a threat to ‘scientific independence’. 
Conventional principals, such as research coun-
cils, like to engage Science as a co-principal in their 
endeavours. Reference to Science creates a bond 
with the scientific community, and thus helps re-
search councils strengthen their influence in the mi-
cro level of the research system without jeopardising 
their relationship with government. Research coun-
cils as institutions also value their independence and 
find, much like scientists, a more congenial ration-
alisation of their own position as agents by casting 
themselves as servants of Science rather than of pol-
itical masters. This might be termed a strategy of 
‘reattribution’ of policies in order to manage  
the threats they might otherwise pose. Additionally, 
in the same way as an alliance with industry and  
By ‘science’, scientists often appear to 
mean the whole amalgam of past and 
new knowledge, new enabling 
technologies, methodological 
discipline, intellectual fashion, and the 
successes of competitors 
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development of a common agenda with industry — 
for example through foresight exercises — can posi-
tively shape the relationship of research councils 
with government, so may a lateral alliance with Sci-
ence add to their authority with both government 
and the national community of scientists. ‘Science’ 
thus becomes an important strategic resource at both 
the micro and meso levels of the system, and by its 
potential to influence the balance of power between 
levels may contribute to the evolution of the system. 
Co-existing with this use of Science, the “abstract 
sponsor”, as a collective strategic resource, is a con-
tingent use of Science to justify preferred ways of 
working, to blot out other pressures, or privilege de-
cisions made by scientists. At interview, scientists 
cited the nature of science to claim immunity from 
certain kinds of accountability or direction; cited 
science rather than policy as the reason for their re-
search choices; and were concerned, in the name of 
good science, about others than scientists taking de-
cisions on science. Science used in this way is im-
portant both for the internal social organisation of 
the micro-world — reinforcing the institutions of 
self-governance such as peer review — and for nego-
tiating boundaries and relationships across levels. It 
is a strategy that researchers deploy to help protect 
their personal and professional space. 
The strategic use of Science is thus a strategy pur-
sued at the collective level of the scientific commu-
nity, including those cross-border members of the 
community who have chosen to inhabit the meso-
world of research councils or other science funding 
bodies. It is a potent device for reattributing actions 
(i.e. to scientific need rather than obedience to gov-
ernment) and thus maintaining scientists’ self-image 
as independent academics. 
The above strategies are premised on a distinction 
between the requirements of government policies and 
the interests of Science. It has been a common com-
plaint of scientists since the 1980s that macro-level 
government policies for steering research fail suffi-
ciently to recognise the authority of Science. The 
strong imprint of the work of ‘purification’ of science 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the Van-
nevar Bush doctrine of a free rein for science (Bush, 
1945) has encouraged the assumption, not least 
among scientists, that strong government policies, 
especially those aiming at ‘relevance’, will severely 
constrain science and stultify future progress — de-
spite ample evidence of both the historical and con-
temporary peaceful co-existence of relevant and basic 
research (Rip, 1997; Stokes, 1997). The continuing 
transformations that are taking place in the research 
process however (Nowotny et al, 2003) provide 
grounds to argue that scientists’ position on this may 
be closer to government’s than may at first appear. 
Few in the academic community would choose to 
quarrel with the government view that the primary 
justification for public support for science is its po-
tential usefulness to the nation. This was also the 
basis of Bush’s case to the US Government back in 
1945 (Bush, 1945). Though in the UK the explicit 
statement in the 1993 White Paper that the rationale 
for public support for science was “wealth creation” 
(OST, 1993) caused something of a frisson at the 
time (see for example Richmond, 1993; MRC, 
2000), for the majority of scientists the concern was, 
and is, less about the principle and more about the 
degree to which the link between research and bene-
fit might need to be direct and demonstrable. This 
was evident in the empirical data, both through di-
rect statement and stories of unpredictable useful 
outcomes of research. 
The UK Government, like many others, having 
built a significant part of its economic policy around 
science for many years, shares with the scientists a 
common vested interest in keeping alive faith in the 
benefits of science. Scientists may rationalise these 
benefits rather more expansively (including valuing 
research as “a cultural and intellectual pursuit”; 
RCUK, 2004) but in practice they and government 
work to a common cause of assuring that science can 
deliver. This helps create a climate for negotiation 
over science-specific policies and may encourage 
government to moderation over the imposition of 
ideology-driven policies (such as new managerial-
ism) on science. Though seldom explicitly acknowl-
edged, this is de facto a collective strategy for agents 
to agree common goals with the principal (an ac-
knowledged way of reducing conflict in a principal-
agent relationship; Van der Meulen, 1998) and so 
contributes to maintaining a modified independence 
for scientists, as well as improving their funding 
prospects. 
Peer review and the research council world 
The instrumental use of Science is taken further in 
the way features of the internal social organisation 
of science have been crystallised out into the system 
of peer review for resource allocation and evaluation 
of results. This makes an interesting example of 
creative, and functional, infrastructure building. Sci-
ence still carries some of the authority associated 
with the abstract sponsor, but it is operating under 
the control and serving the collective interests of its 
agents, the scientists. 
The peer-review system serves to reinforce scien-
tists’ confidence in their collective independence 
and intellectual freedom, by bringing resource allo-
cation under the umbrella of the wider academic 
peer review system, which “generates reputations 
and so helps to reinforce identities” (Henkel, 2000a). 
It bolsters scientists’ assertion of their independence 
by providing some justification for their rhetorical 
claims (Mulkay, 1979; Gieryn, 1983) that they feel 
themselves primarily accountable to their peers. Peer 
judgements will also reflect shared views in the sci-
entific community on topics and approaches that are 
most timely and promising so that the implementa-
tion of policy may subtly modulate it towards com-
mon goals. 
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Peer review may also influence policy by provid-
ing a means by which the ‘lower’ levels of a multi-
level system (here the research councils and the sci-
entific research community) may constrain the deci-
sion space of the macro level, by requiring the 
legitimation by peer review of even the most 
strongly government-backed initiatives. They may 
set boundaries to how specific a top-down initiative 
may be, by retaining the ultimate say on whether the 
necessary scientific competence exists to enable a 
programme to go ahead; they may hold up or re-
channel agreed programmes if there are concerns 
about scientific quality (the early days of the UK 
Government LINK programme for university/ 
industry collaboration were a case in point); and 
they constrain (to a point) the processes that the 
macro level can use for the allocation of resources 
without loss of legitimacy or prestige. 
Peer review is a well-established (though not un-
touchable) part of the research system that scientists 
can use to modify the course of policies in their im-
plementation and to act as an ally in their work of 
reinterpretation of policies. 
While research councils and similar meso-level 
bodies have a particularly significant role as sup-
porters of the peer-review system, they also have a 
well-recognised role as mediators of policy, and this 
enters into researchers’ calculations. In the UK the 
meso level is dominated by research councils, 
whereas in other countries (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Sweden) there is often a more varied meso-level 
population. The hardening of the government atti-
tude to science spending and public accountability of 
the later twentieth century caused a shift in the gov-
ernment-research councils’ relationship to less trust, 
more monitoring and more planning. This cascaded 
down through the system, as research councils in 
turn applied these same accountability principles to 
the research performers, to shift research councils’ 
relationships with scientists in similar directions. As 
intermediary bodies, the research councils have to 
grade these shifts finely. On the one hand they need 
to satisfy government of their commitment to gov-
ernment goals; on the other hand they need to main-
tain their closeness to the scientific community. 
There is some evidence that, overall, UK life sci-
entists make less use of this potential plasticity of 
the research councils than they might. At the level of 
the individual grant application, scientists make ef-
forts to create productive relationships with the 
councils as funding bodies, and they rely on the 
councils (and their peer-review committees) to un-
derstand the problems of scientists and allow some 
latitude in their assessment of projects and their ap-
plication of rules of accountability (Morris, 2003). 
But this is using the councils only to manage the 
pace of change, whereas they could do more. Coun-
cils, dependent as they are on the scientific commu-
nity, are potentially a medium through which the 
community can introduce its own agenda into gov-
ernment policies. But this seems to work mainly 
through individual initiative of committee members 
and is rarely coordinated (except by the councils). 
Plurality of funding 
A further feature of the UK research system that 
provides strategic opportunities for research per-
formers is the plurality of funding sources (multiple 
principals in principal-agent terms). Researchers 
have developed strategies for building good relations 
with many of these prospective sponsors, and for 
opportunistically migrating between them when a 
coincidence of research agendas occurs. Thus the 
presence of multiple principals in the science policy 
arena gives established agents the opportunity to 
seek a principal whose research goals are close to 
their own, or whose contractual terms and supervi-
sion practices are more congenial, and thus mitigate 
the sharp edges of the principal-agent relationship 
and its interference with their preferred research 
programme. For researchers embarking on their ca-
reer the multiplicity of principals provides a choice 
of entry points. In this way, multiple funding sources 
offer opportunities for buffering the effects of more 
prescriptive policies and maintaining independence. 
They also serve a significant function in adding to 
the security of research groups’ funding. Group 
leaders commonly adopt the strategy of diversifying 
their sources of funding so as to hedge the risk of 
one sponsor pulling out abruptly. The risk of this is 
greater at times when sponsors have quite specific 
agendas and changing priorities. The added impor-
tance of diverse sources of funding to mitigate this 
insecurity has implications also for the growth of 
local institutional management. Part of scientists’ 
strategic response to policies has been to develop 
departmental and central university management to 
provide new services such as dissemination of in-
formation about funding opportunities, public rela-
tions and strengthened administrative support. The 
departmental role is also extending into strategic 
scientific management, aligning the departments’ 
development and recruiting plans with what are per-
ceived to be the long-term funding opportunities. A 
further indication of how scientists’ attitudes evolve 
in changing research environments is the general 
acceptance of the concept of there being a depart-
mental programme and the degree of “direction” this 
implies (Morris, 2002a). 
The presence of multiple funding sources, along 
with the need for security of funding, has also led to 
the development of an elaborate repertoire of strate-
gies at individual and research group level to 
strengthen relations with sponsors, match agendas, 
or ‘pick and mix’ among schemes and funding 
sources. A detailed study of these group-level strate-
gies, from a principal-agent perspective, is the sub-
ject of another paper, and we therefore do no more 
here than note their significance in enabling (and at 
times subverting) the implementation of policies and 
effecting a reconciliation (albeit often partial and 
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temporary) between the sponsors’ and the scientists’ 
goals. 
The re-framing of working with industry 
In the hands of the academic research community, 
the policy requirement to “work with industry” 
seems to have been mutated, and in many cases at-
tenuated, to fit better with researchers’ personal 
predilections. UK Government policy statements 
stress the stimulus to the economy from innovation 
and exploitation and cite university spin-off compa-
nies and licensing agreements as measures of suc-
cess (HEFCE, 2003; DTI, 2002). The emphasis is on 
entrepreneurship and industrially oriented innova-
tion, and several special funding streams have been 
developed to aid these activities (DTI, 2002). 
But although biotechnology, genetic manipulation 
and bioinformatics have brought the life sciences to 
the forefront of industrial interests, empirical studies 
suggest that academic entrepreneurship and technol-
ogy transfer, though immensely grown in status and 
achievement, are still a passion of the few, albeit a 
prestigious and influential few. Much of the “work-
ing with industry” in university departments consists 
of routine contract work, consultancy, and some in-
dustry funding of postgraduate students. Academics 
can assimilate this into their normal way of life; their 
substantial funding and their mainstream research 
interests continue to be in the public sector (Morris, 
2002b). There are examples from chemistry and en-
gineering (Rip, 1997; Disco et al, 1992; Blumenthal 
et al, 1997) suggesting that biological scientists may 
not be typical in this respect. There is however also 
evidence of a choice of roles, with many preferring 
to remain academic, in outlook and in profession 
(Atkinson-Grosjean, 2005; Rosenberg and Nelson, 
1994; Bird and Allen, 1989), and within life sciences 
indicative evidence of much pedestrian industry-
oriented research (Blumenthal et al, 1996, 1997; 
Howells et al, 1998; Cohen et al, 2001). 
The UK Government has not seen fit to challenge 
this interpretation of its policy. It seems content to 
continue to allow academics this discretionary space, 
where they comfortably use industry as a form of 
income generation and still look for their intellectual 
stimulation and material reward to the academic 
world. While there are tensions implicit in this situa-
tion, there is some justification for life scientists’ 
unspoken reinterpretation of the policy in the con-
clusions of analysts such as Senker et al (1998) who 
recommend that government should increase the 
number of communication channels rather than put 
the emphasis on large-scale formal collaborations. 
An optimistic view of the strategy of reinterpretation 
in this instance might be that it would buy time for a 
reconciliation of positions along these more inclu-
sive lines. 
Furthermore, non-entrepreneurial academics fre-
quently choose to attribute their working with indus-
try, not to the influence of government exhortations 
(however reinterpreted), but to their personal finan-
cial strategy for diversifying funding or creating a 
pot of contract income to use for their mainstream 
programme. The combination of the strategy of cov-
ert reinterpretation and the appropriation of selected 
elements in the service of other aims has an overall 
effect on the working of the micro level of the re-
search system by reasserting and reinforcing the pri-
ority of local and professional concerns, and 
diminishing the visibility and influence of external 
policies. 
Conclusions 
A first general conclusion from this study of re-
searchers in the life sciences is that these actors 
show adaptation, but not transformation. They have 
shifted their ideas and practices sufficiently to coop-
erate with a more intrusive policy regime, but with-
out stepping out of their traditional academic 
framework and the matrix of concerns that shape an 
academic scientist’s career. This has required some 
readjustment of their stereotypical self-image as sci-
entists to give more prominence to resource mobili-
sation and management skills. The repertoire of 
strategies we have discussed forms an important tool 
for achieving this controlled adaptation and manag-
ing the continuing tension between freedom and 
control in their relationships with their sponsors and 
the threats to financial stability. Cumulatively the 
range of activities represents quite significant addi-
tions and extensions to the older, idealised concepts 
of what ‘doing research’ means, with activities out-
side the laboratory assuming increasing importance, 
and new skills needing to be developed for these 
tasks. 
Of course, such political skills, though for a long 
time ignored, have always formed an essential part 
of a successful research career (Latour, 1987). But 
acknowledgement of their importance is becoming 
more general among practitioners. Although our 
empirical data was drawn only from biologi-
cal/biomedical scientists, studies in the literature on 
other countries and other disciplines (Atkinson-
Grosjean, 2005; Harman, 2005; Shove, 2000; Van 
Non-entrepreneurial academics 
frequently choose to attribute their 
working with industry to their 
personal financial strategy for 
diversifying funding or creating a pot 
of contract income to use for their 
mainstream programme 
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der Meulen and Van der Most, 2002) suggest similar 
processes of adaptation and perseverance are taking 
place on a wider front. 
Researchers’ responses are of course embedded in 
a system. Historical and structural features of the 
system are important for the viability of researchers’ 
strategies, and the synergies that may develop with 
other system levels (such as with the research coun-
cils over the use of Science as an abstract sponsor) 
reinforce the strategies’ effectiveness and may influ-
ence how the system evolves. If one envisages gov-
ernment and the research performers as being at the 
two extremes of a linear scale, with research coun-
cils somewhere in the middle, then the councils can 
be thought of as moving nearer to the performers or 
nearer to government in accord with political or 
other pressures. Government initiatives in the UK in 
the 1980s and 1990s drew councils closer to gov-
ernment (e.g. through closer accountability and 
structural reforms announced in the 1993 White Pa-
per; OST, 1993). The shared strategy of referring to 
the authority of ‘Science’ tends to shift them back 
towards the scientific community. 
A number of strategies on which researchers 
heavily rely, as they attempt to manage policies 
ranging from accountability to collaborating with 
users to steering of research, are tailored to exploit 
particular structural features of the system (like mul-
tiple funding sources) or operating practices (like 
peer review). For these strategies to remain viable 
such features need to persist. Plurality of funding 
and the shared faith in Science as an economic 
driver are deeply engrained in the UK system and 
they and researchers’ strategies are likely to be mu-
tually supportive. Thus researchers’ strategies tend 
to strengthen and perpetuate these system features. 
There may however be questions as to whether 
“peer review” as used in the policy field can endure 
in its present form in the light of pressures for “so-
cially robust” knowledge (Nowotny, 2001; DoH, 
2001; DTI, 2000), and whether researchers are stra-
tegically equipped to manage such a challenge. 
Modifications to date have not as yet undermined 
peer review’s essential character as an aspect of sci-
entific self-governance. The introduction of industry 
into formal decision-making was indeed one of the 
less disruptive parts of the science policy changes of 
the later twentieth century (since industry represen-
tatives often came from research divisions or shared 
a commitment to basic research; CBI, 1997; Senker 
et al, 1998); but it must be doubtful whether public 
participation could be assimilated so smoothly, since 
the public voice will be more heterogeneous and 
possibly more demanding. There could be effects on 
parts of the research system on which scientists now 
depend, such as the convergence of policy priorities 
with scientific trends. 
Significant diminution of the voice of science in 
the peer-review process would require another sig-
nificant adjustment for scientific researchers. ‘The 
public’ under such a regime would become another 
constituency for researchers to manage — and pos-
sibly to exploit. Industry can be useful to scientists 
(at both meso and micro levels) as a foil to govern-
ment (see for example Van der Meulen, 2003) and 
an independent but non-disruptive voice in peer 
review. Strategies of reinterpretation, cultural har-
monisation, and identification of specific projects of 
mutual interest might be developed to meet this 
further policy challenge. 
Researchers’ strategies are primarily designed to 
create a space for negotiation and manoeuvre. This 
allows them to sustain their work and possibly influ-
ence the evolution of the system. It is helpful that 
ambiguity and flexibility are pervasive within the 
UK research system. There are concordances and 
ambiguities at the heart of the system, which favour 
the construction of a fuzzy-edged scenario in which 
scientists can more easily combine (more or less sat-
isfactorily) fulfilment of their scientific aspirations 
and compliance with a science-policy agenda. 
Flexibility within the system derives from several 
interlocking strands: the shared commitment of gov-
ernment and scientists to the pursuit and furtherance 
of science; the ambiguity of government formulation 
of policies (being set out only in broad terms, with 
the details filled in by the science community); tacit 
understandings between grant recipients and re-
search councils; and sponsors’ condonement of in-
cluding ‘Science’ as a kind of third party to 
sponsorship transactions with an assumed agenda of 
its own. This partly compensates for the relative 
paucity of consensus-building organisations in the 
meso-level of the UK system and creates space for 
scientists to accommodate their own agenda within 
programmes geared to the principal’s objectives. 
While some specific flexibilities (like research 
councils’ cavalier attitudes to some of their own ac-
counting rules) may be ripe for tightening; others 
appear to be rooted in such fundamental propositions 
as the open-ended nature of scientific research or 
government’s dependence on science-based eco-
nomic growth, and would not be easily eradicable. 
On balance, the findings from this study are posi-
tive regarding the resilience of research performers 
and the survival and growth of good and useful sci-
ence through periods of adverse or disruptive 
change. Although a generation has passed since the 
main changes, the old issues are still debated, but the 
work of mobilising resources and gaining credit con-
tinues apace, with some readjustment of the balance 
of effort. Similar adjustments have been made in 
other countries (Braun and Merrien, 1999; Benner 
and Sandstrom, 2000; Atkinson-Grosjean, 2005; 
Behrens and Gray, 2001). Researchers’ strategies of 
re-attribution, reinterpretation and exploiting system 
features allow continuance of aspects of the old ide-
ology of science and its practice, and provide re-
searchers with the room for manoeuvre they need, 
and a frame within which shifts can be made without 
seriously compromising an academic research 
agenda or their sense of intellectual integrity. 
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We called researchers’ strategies a scaffolding. 
Like scaffolding, they have rough edges, are func-
tional rather than aesthetically pleasing, and though 
often staying in place a long time are ultimately im-
permanent. They are not solely a means of shoring 
up a crumbling edifice, but a platform behind which 
the work of repair, refurbishment and reconstruction 
of a battered system can go forward, while the busi-
ness of academic research goes on. 
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